balagangadhara additional quote

3. There is another, albeit related, point to the previous hypothesis. In a culture where ‘selves’ are not
reflexive at all or are only partially so, but one whose ideal (or ‘self-image’) is governed by that of
reflexivity, stories continue to be important but in a transmuted form. They continue to depict events and
situations, but are powerless to teach. That is, they retain their instructional nature without being able to
instruct. There is such a genre in Western culture: utopian thought. They are instructional in nature without
really instructing. (That is exactly what the moral imperatives, the ‘oughts’, are.) They depict events and
situations which are not “real”, i.e., not the “is’, but outside of it, viz., in utopia. They depict “non-real”
situations and events with the explicit claim of doing so. Because of this, they can continue to exist only if
they entertain and that depends on the ‘aesthetic’ taste of the population at any given moment. The
modern day utopian thought is known well enough to all of us to recognize it as so without doubt: science
fiction.
4. If we learn to be moral beings through mimesis, it means that moral and ethical actions must be
susceptible to being mimed. Contrast this stance with that of the West: a moral individual (an ideal priest
or, say, Jesus Christ) is inimitable in principle. That is, a moral individual is actually a message, which does not
say “be like me”, but one which proclaims “hope” for the humankind, brings “glad tidings” so to speak.
And the “hope” is that the presence of such an inimitable, exceptional individual will “save” humankind. If
one is “righteous”, it is not only because that is the way to one’s ‘salvation’, but more importantly, because the
salvation of humankind depends upon the “righteous” being present amongst them. One is “moral” so that
other ‘sinners’ may be delivered from their ‘sins’. Such figures cannot influence daily life positively, but do
so negatively viz., as examples of what we ordinary mortals, cannot be. They are, literally, the embodiments
of ‘ought’ and, as such, outside the ‘is’ (Not every human being can be an ideal priest or even, as the
examples tell us, ought to be one.)
In Asia, such an ‘ought’ is no moral example at all. A moral action must be capable of emulation in daily
life and only as such can someone be an ‘example’. Moral actions are actions that a son, a father, a friend, a
teacher, a wife, etc., can perform as a son, a father, a friend, a teacher, a wife, etc. Either moral actions are
realizable in this world, and in circumstances we find ourselves in our daily lives or they are not moral
actions at all. Therefore, those real or fictitious individuals whose actions we mime and who are,
consequently, construed as ‘exemplary’ individuals cannot find themselves ‘outside’ our world, but in
situations analogous to our own. (Such a view is consistent with our models of ‘self’, for obvious reasons.)
5. This suggests that the role of moral authorities in these two cultures is different. In the West, the moral
authorities are rigid principles without mercy or forgiveness. All talk of autonomy notwithstanding, moral
‘decisions’ are totally heteronymous. One has to reflect not only about the principle one has to apply, but
also judge whether one has correctly applied it. As a consequence, moral domain becomes one of
judgement. The objects of judgement are and can only be conceptual ones, viz., theories. To say that some
action is moral is to say whether or not the description of that action satisfies some or other moral
principle. We have noticed this already. Moral life gets impoverished by being reduced to a principle (e.g.
utilitarianism) or by being at the mercy of another’s ‘judgement’ (e.g., that of a priest).
In Asia, by contrast, the immediate physically recognizable authority figures (parents, teachers, elders) are
also figures of moral authority. Mimesis in moral action requires figures recognized as moral authorities.
Consequently, in a culture dominated by mimetic learning, not only do such authorities play an important
role in regulating moral conduct, but are also so recognized. That is why, I suggest, parents, teachers,
elders, ancestors have such a privileged position in our culture. They are not only familial or socially
recognized authorities, but are individually recognized moral authorities also.

[04-April-2024, sks: both deontological and utilitarian ethics are principle-based ethical systems whereas the ethical in heathen traditions is carried along or develops within the web of obligations of dharma or the trajectory of successive karmas, each set of which is necessarily distinct or unique for any experiencing entity (and further compounded in terms of all its interactions with those of other entities over time). With such a variegate concatenation of the ethical in the heathen, ie endless permutations/combinations not only among interacting living and nonliving entities/jivas but also with their capture in past tradition, no propaganda is possible, no ideology is possible. The ethical does not reside in the domain of ideas/beliefs/theories in heathen ontology. Thus the telling of any narrative in heathen tradition elicits no moral quandary. It is simply experienced as a unit of learning. Whereas the west necessarily constructs moral anvils and hammers in every narrative it tells, so much so that its narratives develop secondarily to its elaborated moral theories/propagandas, which are independently learned and privileged over the accompanying narratives; the former (ie, moral theorizing) informs the latter (ie, narratives). Just look at any morally sanctimonious geopolitical statement/judgment coming out of the west... the narrative is secondarily crafted to the initial moral insinuation developed from theology/theory and thus enveloped with bias (completely contrary to the common western perception that theories/theology/religion/revelation remove bias). Over time, the set of moral insinuations regarding the native gets complexed into stereotypes. Or perhaps these insinuations do not even develop over time but propagate over the breadth of a discourse. 

Empiricism is the attempt of primary western theorizing to ground itself in the real world. Its true domain is the moral, the political, and the sanctimonious (with history bearing witness to this - rise of the category of the modern in the 13th or so century per JSD's first book). Only secondarily does empiricism intrude into the material world and it does so in an effort to divert attention from its primary domain. The "rational" is thus foremost a category in Orientalism alongside the native or the other or the subjugated painted as irrational.]